Labour market policies settled at national level imply a "one-size-fits-all" labour market strategy. This strategy might not sufficiently take into account region-specific economic structures. We employ a panel factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) to evaluate whether active labour market programmes (ALMPs) might asymmetrically affect labour markets at regional level in a data-rich environment. The paper focuses on Italian regions. Our results suggest that while in the South employment is mainly driven by social and economic context variables, in the North the employment dynamics is significantly explained by policy interventions. Finally, we suggest two main policy implications. First, the success of active policies depends on the regional labour market conditions. Second, policymakers should adjust labour policy strategy to the regional economic structure
Introduction
This paper explores the role that active labour market policies (henceforth ALMP) set at national level might have on regional labour market performance. The hypothesis underlying our empirical investigation is that, given the dualistic economic structure of the Italian regions, ALMP might produce asymmetric effects on regional labour markets. More specifically, ALMP may asymmetrically influence the matching process as well as the labour market equilibrium conditions at a regional level.
Government expenditure on labour market policies (LMPs) can be divided into two categories, active and passive. Passive policies include payments of unemployment benefits in the form of unemployment insurance or social assistance. ALMPs are, instead, policy interventions targeting certain sub-groups on the labour market, aiming to activate the unemployed to enhance employability.
From a theoretical point of view the effects of ALMPs can be analysed by evaluating their impact on the equilibrium relationship between unemployment and vacancies within a model of job search and matching, i.e. the Beveridge Curve framework. This curve represents a negative relationship between unemployed workers and the number of unfilled jobs (vacancies). More precisely, the Beveridge Curve 1 can be viewed as the result of a process in which workers and firms engage in a costly search, due to informational or locational imperfections, to find each other. The key argument is that the "matching function" (e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001 ) describes the ways the match between unemployed workers and unfilled jobs takes place; the behaviour of workers in searching for a job; the behaviour of employers in screening applicants for a vacancy and the probability that the job contact takes place.
The determinants of the matching function influence the position and the slope of the Beveridge Curve. The slopes depends on the search intensity of job seekers and on labour market mismatches, while the job finding rate, hence the equilibrium condition, also depends on the decision of a job seeker to accept a job and on the employer's acceptance decision (e.g. Shimer, 2005; Yashiv 2006 ).
However, other key variables influencing the equilibrium condition are those factors resulting in skill, sector and regional mismatches. Several authors (Armstrong and Taylor 2000; Jones and Manning, 1992; Gorter and Van Ours, 1994; Dixon et al. 2010) have applied the Beveridge curve 3 framework to regional studies, seeking to verify the extent to which the different regional rates of unemployment could be explained by differences in labour market imperfections, as opposed to differences in effective demand. The main idea is that movements in the Beveridge curve may be partly explained by changes in the cross-region dispersion of employment growth. Indeed, if labour demand is growing in some parts of the country while shrinking in others, a regional mismatch may take place. As a consequence, in order for the unemployed to be matched with available vacancies, they should move across regions. This costly and time-consuming reallocation mechanism delays the job-matching process and increases the probability of high levels of both unemployment and vacancies. And the higher these barriers, the more diverse are the matching equilibrium conditions and hence the slope and position of the curve in the different regions.
The position and slope of the Beveridge curve are also significantly affected by active labour policies (Jackman et al. 1990 ). More active than passive labour policies cause the Beveridge Curve to shift inward since they reduce labour market mismatches and search frictions. Nevertheless, the final effect of ALMPs on regional labour market tightness could be heterogeneous and uncertain.
Despite many empirical evaluation studies no clear-cut cross-country evidence exists on the determinants of ALMP effectiveness. In general, microeconometric evaluation studies have found that ALMPs have at best a modest impact on participants' labour market prospects. Their success depends on the type and duration of the program, the characteristics of the participants, and the evaluation methodology. Analysing cross-country evidence on the effectiveness of specific programmes on different target groups, Heckman et al. (1999) give a detailed overview of several microeconometric evaluation studies. They conclude that labour market programmes have a minor effect on labour market performance. Furthermore, they find considerable heterogeneity in the impact of such programmes.
Using meta-analysis, Kluve (2010) evaluates the effect of 137 different studies on programme evaluation from 19 countries. His results suggest that it is almost exclusively the programme type that seems to influence the effectiveness of the active measures. While the effectiveness of direct employment programmes in the public sector seems to be very low, wage subsidies and job search assistance are the top performing policies. The effect of training programmes, which represent the most widely used type of active policy, on labour market participants is not very large. These results are in line with that obtained in Card et al. (2009) where it was also found that ALMP programmes do not seem to have differential effects on men versus women.
While microeconometric evaluation studies aim to analyse the likely effects that a particular programme might have on individuals, macroeconomic studies are usually employed to evaluate the effect of the ALMP on aggregate employment or for the economy as whole. There are two alternatives to consider: whether ALMPs positively affect both unemployment and output, or whether the effect is simply distributional, that is, whether work is shifted from the old to the young or from one region to another (Bellman and Jackman, 1996) . In general this literature stresses that, when taking into account not only the direct effects on participants but also the indirect effects on non-participants, negative effects (like displacement, deadweight and substitution effects) may worsen the labour market outcomes 2 .
This framework has been used by several studies based on OECD data which explain the cross-country variation in unemployment rates by the cross-country variation in a number of labour market institutions; one of them is the ALMP (Layard et al., 1991; Nickell and Layard, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) .
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the analysis of the macroeconomic effect of specific programmes of active labour policies using regional data (Hujer et al., 2006; Fertig et al., 2006; Puhani, 2003) . Most of these studies estimate an augmented Beveridge curve and find mixed results regarding the effects of the ALMP on labour market performance.
However, there are few studies focusing on whether regional disparities might influence the effectiveness of the ALMP. Gerfin and Lechner (2002) , for example, analyse several active labour market measures adopted in Switzerland during the 1990s. Despite highlighting the considerable differences in youth unemployment rates between the German-speaking cantons and the nonGerman-speaking cantons as well as the strong regional heterogeneity in the programme's allocation process, the authors mainly focus on partial-equilibrium effects of the ALMP. Using data from administrative unemployment and social security records they find that whereas traditional employment programmes negatively affect labour market performance, a wage subsidy for temporary jobs has a significant positive effect.
Following Warren's seminal paper (1991) , several authors such as Fahr and Sunde (2006) , and Ilmakunnas and Pesola (2003) apply a stochastic production frontier approach to model the matching process at regional level. Destefanis and Fonseca (2007) adopt a similar approach to evaluate the impact of a labour market reform in Italy (the so-called Treu Reform of 1996) on the unemployment-vacancy relationship across regions. They find the existence of a substantial difference in the matching efficiency between the southern and northern regions.
In Italy, although the institutional setting may differ little between southern and northern regions there are substantial economic differences between the two parts of the country.
Nevertheless, evaluation to date has been mainly carried out using the conventional micro-oriented approach to policy evaluation 3 .
2 See Altavilla and Caroleo (2006b) . For a review of the debate on the evaluation of the effects of the ALMP on labour markets see: Kluve et al. (2006) ; Kluve (2010); Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstròm (2001); Caliendo et al. (2008) , Büttner and Prey (1998) . 3 For a comprehensive survey of the evaluation studies carried out in Italy, see Trivellato et al. (2003) and Trivellato (2009) .
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The present paper investigates to what extent regional labour markets in Italy might be asymmetrically influenced by labour policy measures that ignore differences in regional economic structures. The method chosen to evaluate ALMPs in Italy is a dynamic multivariate panel model which enables estimation of the net effects of ALMP participation on employment or unemployment in a regional framework.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes some stylized facts. Section 3 reports the empirical findings and discusses the effects of an ALMP shock on labour market variables. Section 4 focuses on regional policy implications. Section 5 summarizes the paper's main findings and concludes.
Stylized facts
Since the mid 1970s, most OECD countries have progressively shifted resources from passive income support, like unemployment benefits, to activation measures. In general, expenditure on ALMPs increased over the 80s and 90s with a peak in the mid 90s when countries reacted to high unemployment levels that persisted after the recession of the early 90s. Lower unemployment levels during the following decade have been accompanied by a decrease in the share of GDP devoted to ALMPs. In Europe, the increase in ALMP expenditure has been significantly influenced by the establishment of the European Employment Strategy (EES). This strategy has stressed the importance of the interaction between active and passive policies in influencing labour market outcomes 4 . In EU countries, ALMP design varies considerably depending on the specific country characteristics and the period when such programmes are implemented. (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007) and temporary work agencies were introduced to give more flexibility within otherwise rigid employment protection legislation. On the other, in line with the progressive decision-making decentralization of public administration, management of most active labour market policies was transferred to local institutions (Regions or Provinces). In particular, Italian regional and provincial authorities now organize public employment services and the regional training system, and determine specific policy measures in favour of disadvantaged groups (Altavilla et al. 2009 ).
Management of passive expenditure and of the measures supporting hiring and training still remain the main expenditures made at a national level.
A detailed classification of the main expenditures of Italian LMP is reported in Table 2 . Although these disparities have been well-documented in both empirical and theoretical studies, labour market policies have been designed without a regional-specific orientation. We are now interested in analysing whether the consequence of this strategy has been a homogenous use of ALMP across regions. Table 4 reports the percentage of participant as share of total labour force in both the South and the North for the main policy interventions (classified by type of action).
It clearly emerges that, during the sample period analysed in the paper, northern and southern regions have implemented an almost identical policy mix. In fact, the interventions they have made in order to boost the labour market performance are very similar. The strategy involves extensive use of recruitment incentives (more permanent than temporary) and training (more workplace training than apprenticeship). Other measures like job rotation and job sharing (measure 3), supported employment and rehabilitation (measure 5), and direct job creation (measure 6) have received much less attention. Note: The figure reports, for each region, the distribution of training and employment incentives as share of total ALMP over the sample period.
In order to further investigate whether Italian regions have homogenously used ALMP we test the statistical significance of the difference with dummy variable regression models.
Precisely, we estimate the following equations:
Where the dependent variables are the share of participants in ALMP, Training and Employment incentives programs over the labour force for region i (i=1,2,…20) at time t; and, d is a dummy variable that takes value one if region i is in southern Italy and zero otherwise. The coefficients 1 α , 1 β and 1 γ capture the average difference in the dependent variables between northern and southern regions.
13
The results obtained with OLS are reported in Table 5 .
On average, southern regions use more employment incentives than northern regions (0.23).
The opposite is true for the training programs (-0.4). Overall, the number of participants in ALMP as percentage of labour force is lower in the South (-0.16 ).
Looking at the standard errors (s.e.) reported in the table we can evaluate whether these differences are statistically significant. The differences in ALMP and in the employment incentives programs are not statistically different from zero. The only significant difference is related to the training schemes. However, this result is completely driven by the value of Aosta Valley. In fact, when excluding Aosta Valley from the regression, the difference becomes not statistically significant: the value of 1 β becomes 0.06 with a standard error of 0.07. In this case, also the fit of the model, as summarized by the R 2 , increases from 0.39 to 0.51.
We can conclude that Italian regions have followed a common labour market strategy irrespectively of their economic structure peculiarities. This strategy, settled at national level, has induced region to follow policies that have not sufficiently taken into account the different characteristics of the regional labour markets. 
Macro-econometric framework
This paper aims to empirically evaluate whether the "one-size-fits-all" labour market strategy adopted by Italian policymakers during the last decade might generate asymmetries in the effect of ALMPs on regional labour market performance. Using a panel-factor augmented-vector autoregression (FAVAR) we estimate whether ALMPs might heterogeneously affect labour market variables at a regional level. The hypothesis underlying our empirical investigation is that, given the different economic structures characterizing the Italian regions, ALMPs might produce asymmetric effects on the performance of regional labour markets.
We From inspection of the relationship between the employment rate and ALMP participants relative to the labour force over the entire sample period (Fig. 4) The regression line (the solid black line in figure 4) suggests a mild and positive relationship between employment and ALMP participation. Of course, a linear correlation in no way indicates whether increasing the number of ALMP participants might have a causal effect on the 7 See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of the variables used in the analysis and their sources. 8 The exact relationship between expenses and participants in ALMPs is derived in Altavilla and Caroleo (2006a) and in Calmfors et al. (2001) . 9 Note that ALMP participation in Campania and Basilicata is high because the denominator of our policy measure (labour force) is relatively low. employment rate. This is due to the reverse causation or endogeneity problem. Indeed, given that policymakers react to rising unemployment or other labour market problems with increased policy efforts, it becomes very difficult to distinguish the effect of policy measures on the labour market.
Basically, expenditures on ALMPs may affect the employment rate, but the level of employment may equally affect spending on ALMPs. This problem represents the main issue a researcher faces when evaluating the effect of ALMPs with a macroeconomic model. Any empirical approach that intends to capture how an ALMP shock is transmitted to the labour market has to take this "reverse causation" relationship explicitly into account. The macroeconomic literature typically estimates these impacts using vector autoregressions (VAR).
This framework estimates the effects of labour policy instrument shocks without, a priori, dismissing any of the potential correlations and causal relationships among the variables included in a model. However, VAR models usually contain a very small number of variables relative to the information set monitored by labour market authorities. The rationale for only utilizing a small subset of the available information in VARs is that these models lose degrees of freedom as more variables are added -the so-called 'curse of dimensionality'. Therefore, our analysis builds on the factor augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) approach suggested by Bernanke et al. (2005) .
This approach uses factor extraction techniques to summarise the relevant information from a large set of time series 10 . Thus, the advantage of the FAVAR approach is that all potentially relevant information for policymakers can be taken into consideration.
A panel FAVAR model
The econometric model we use to evaluate the effect of ALMPs on labour market performance is a panel factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR). As stressed above, the choice of the model is motivated by two main reasons. First, FAVAR allows us to solve the endogeneity problem and then correctly identify the effect of an ALMP shock on labour market variables by imposing a set of exclusion restrictions. Second, FAVAR is a flexible model that identifies dynamic relationships among variables in a data-rich environment. Working with more than 120 time series would otherwise not be feasible.
Given the significant difference between Italian regional economies we analyse two areas separately: we consider eight regions 11 for Southern Italy and twelve 12 for Centre-Northern Italy, and specify two different models accordingly. These two models share the same set of explanatory variables and are estimated over the same sample period. 
where L represent the ( ) m k ń´ matrices of factor loadings while it e is a mean-zero error vector representing the idiosyncratic component of it X . Equation (5) is the factor representation of the data. Therefore the model consists of a transition equation (4) and an observation equation (5) similar to that proposed in Bernanke et al. (2005) and can be estimated by employing the two-step principal components procedure suggested in Watson (1998, 2002 
correspond to the eigenvectors of the m largest eigenvalues of X X ′ .
In the second step, the FAVAR model described in equation (4) and an additional identifying assumption imposed. More precisely, model (4) is a reduced form VAR model, which contains a block recursive restriction that the unobservable factors do not respond to the ALMP shocks contemporaneously. A Choleski decomposition of the reduced form covariance matrix V is used to orthogonalize the reduced form innovations and to identify the structural model. We order the ALMP last and treat its innovations as labour policy "shocks". This ordering imposes the identifying assumption that employment and participation rate do not respond to labour policy innovations within the quarter 16 . Note that this recursive order solves the endogeneity problem outlined above. The timing of the model can be summarized as follows: a shock to labour policy instruments in period t affects the employment rate at time t+1. In fact, at time t the employment rate is predetermined, and hence cannot be influenced by any policy instrument. For example, an increase in active labour policy increases labour force participation, thereby facilitating an increase in the employment rate.
In principle, once we have recovered it F )
, the panel FAVAR model can be estimated either under the null of homogeneity, using a fixed effects estimator, or under the alternative of heterogeneity of slope coefficients, i.e. using the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) .
The mean group estimator allows coefficients and error variances to vary across regions and estimates (4) separately for each region. By contrast, a pooled (or fixed effects) estimator assumes that coefficients and error variances are homogeneous across regions, allowing only for regionspecific fixed effects.
As discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1995) , results are likely to vary significantly with respect to the estimation method, i.e. from the least restrictive, but potentially not efficient, mean group estimator, to the fixed effect estimator that only allows intercepts to vary across regions. We estimated the models with both techniques and compute a Haussman type test of the difference 14 The principal components are orthogonal linear combinations of the data that explain the maximal variances of the data contained in it X .
15 In fact, given the rotational indeterminacy problem, unless identification assumptions are imposed on the factor loadings, it will always be possible to find some rotation of the factors which explains the same amount of total variation in the data but implies a different set of factor loadings. 16 We examine the robustness of the main results by adopting alternative identification schemes. 
Empirical Results
This section presents the results of the two-step estimation procedure. We first concentrate on principal component analysis and then on the simulation of the FAVAR model. Figure 5 shows the outcome of principal component analysis by way of a scree plot which maps the largest twenty eigenvalues of the data matrix. There appears to be a natural break at the fourth value, with the remaining eigenvalues flattening out. As shown in Table 6 the first four principal components explain on average 32%, 12%, 7% and 6% of the total variance in our economic series, making a cumulative proportion of 58%. Given the number of the time series included in the analysis, we consider this proportion sufficiently high. By contrast, the fifth and sixth components account for only 3% and 2%, respectively. We also employ the Bai and Ng (2002) procedure for determining the number of static factors and find that PC1 and IC1 criteria substantially support our choice of limiting our analysis to four principal components. Table 7 shows the percentage of variance in a given variable explained by all the factors, i.e. the communality 17 . The communality for a variable is the sum of squared factor loadings for that variable (row), and thus is the percent of variance in a given variable explained by all the factors. To explore what kind of interpretation could be assigned to the first four principal components, we employ an orthogonal rotation of the estimated eigenvectors using the varimax method.
Varimax rotation seeks to maximize the variances of the squared normalized factor loadings across variables for each factor. This is equivalent to maximizing the variances in the columns of the matrix of the squared normalized factor loadings. 17 In complete principal component analysis, with no factors dropped, the communality is equal to 1.0, or 100% of the variance of the given variable. As our model does not extract all the variance, the proportion of variance of a particular variable that is due to common factors is called the communality. The proportion of variance that is unique to each variable is then the respective variable's total variance minus the communality.
20 Table 8 The first rotated principal component is a linear combination that places heavy weights on regional economic series related to the social and economic context in both estimated models. The second rotated eigenvector clearly picks out the indicators associated with investment and hours worked for both south and north. We can now describe how these factors could be used in a standard VAR for evaluating the effect of ALMPs on labour market performance. Once we have estimated the FAVAR we can compute the dynamic effects of ALMP shocks on labour market variables, examining in particular the similarity of employment responses in each area. This is accomplished by using impulse response functions with a structural decomposition of the variance covariance matrix explained above. A 32-quarter horizon is considered. The estimated responses to a 1% increase in ALMP are reported in Figure 6 . Each response is provided with the associated asymptotic confidence bands.
Impulse responses look reasonably well behaved and give rise to the usual hump-shaped dynamics. The figure shows that all response functions are statistically significant. Moreover, the impulse responses for the northern regions are substantially larger than those for the south. Most importantly, the results suggest that the employment rate in the selected regions responds to identical labour policy shocks with different speeds and movements, as well as with different magnitudes of the effects. Table 9 outlines some key characteristics of the estimated response functions. In particular, it gives information about the maximum impact and the average responses of the employment and participation rate to ALMP structural shocks. The table also considers the time that a shock takes to exert its maximum effect on employment and its cumulative effect. Despite some qualitative similarities, the existence of different responses across regions is suggested. In both areas, an ALMP shock produces an increase in the employment rate. However, the magnitudes of the effect are quite dissimilar. Whilst in the South the employment rate increases by more than 20 base points, an ALMP shock in the North raises the employment rate by 38 base points.
The time-profile of the response functions is also significantly different. After an initial delay, the response function displays a hump-shaped pattern that reaches its maximum increase after roughly two years in the North and one year in the South. Asymmetries are also detected in the response of the participation rate. Again, the largest responses are observed in the North: in particular, the response of participation in northern regions reaches a maximum of 26 base points after eight quarters, while the reaction of the southern Italian regions is smaller and more rapid: 13 base points after four quarters. These results might be interpreted as a measure of how effective ALMPs are in supporting job reallocation and boosting reemployment among dismissed workers in the two areas of the country.
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Given the timing of our model, an exogenous ALMP shock is transmitted to employment through participation rate. As for most European countries (Decressin and Fatás, 1995) , we find evidence that a policy shock has a strong effect on the participation rate in both South and North.
The larger effect on participation rate in the northern regions means that in this part of the country an ALMP shock calls upon many more people outside the labour force to participate than in the south. In other words, although the size of shock is identical, the reaction to the shock is stronger in the north where more people enter the labour force. In the south, a smaller percentage of nonparticipants enter the labour force to fill new jobs.
The final effect on employment also depends on the level of job reallocation produced by the ALMP shock. As shown by the cumulative effect of the shock reported in table 9, this reallocation process results in a new equilibrium employment level above the initial value of the shock.
However, the reallocation process associated with the ALMP shock in the North generates a larger amount of additional jobs than the same shock in the South. This means that in the North, the amount of search effort and, in turn, successful job reallocation significantly depends on the levels of ALMP which in turn speed up the transition into new jobs. The different magnitudes of the effect can also be explained by the differences in both the number of vacancies and that of unemployed in the two areas. Whilst the northern regions have a large number of vacancies and fewer unemployed, the South has fewer vacancies and a large number of unemployed. It follows that an identical increase in ALMP has a greater effect on the northern employment rate.
Impulse response analysis also provides an answer to another important policy question: Are similar adjustment patterns observed for ALMP shocks in specific regions within Italy? The different adjustment speeds of employment rates to ALMP shocks reflect persistent differences between North and South. We do find substantial differences between Italian regions in terms of adjustment patterns to an ALMP shock. Table 9 and figure 6 show that the adjustment to a positive ALMP shock in the South is absorbed faster, and that the shock's maximum effect is reached after one year. In the North it seems to take longer and then the cumulative effect on employment is higher. This evidence supports the view that the reallocation rate of unemployed workers and migration flows on the northern labour market are indeed much higher than in other parts of Italy.
The responses of 11 selected variables to a 1% increase in ALMP at relevant horizons (Table 10) are largely in line with our a priori predictions. An increase in ALMP tends to reduce both the unemployment rate and the long-term unemployment. Moreover, GDP and investments positively react to the ALMP shock, in both areas. Our analysis now concentrates on the forecast error variance decomposition. The main strength of this type of analysis is its ability to capture the weight of different variable innovations on a given variable forecast error variance decomposition. In other words, it yields information on the percentage of variation in the forecast error of a variable explained by its own innovation and the proportion explained by innovations in other variables at different horizons. Table 11 depicts the forecast error variance decomposition of the variables in the FAVAR models estimated above up to a six-year horizon. The table gives useful information on the relative ability of ALMP to affect employment dynamics at different horizons. According to the variance decomposition at short horizons, ALMP innovations do not play a major role in the quarterly fluctuations of the employment rate. The dynamics of employment are largely dominated by its own shocks, and they indicate that short-run fluctuations in the employment rate display no association with active labour market programmes or with the dynamics of the participation rate.
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For long horizons, we find that both ALMPs and the participation rate have a certain influence in determining employment dynamics. This influence varies across regions: while in southern regions only 7% of employment movements are driven by ALMP shocks, in the North this percentage more than doubles (almost 16%). Table 11 also illustrates the percentage of variance explained by the estimated common factors.
In the South, the first estimated component, which is related to the social and economic context, does significantly affect movements in the employment rate: after six years, it explains almost 19% of the employment change. In the northern regions, by contrast, employment dynamics seems to be partially explained by the dynamics of the fourth principal component (related to wage and hours worked): in particular, movements in the fourth PC after six years account for almost 20% of employment variation. We may conclude that there are different explanations for employment dynamics in the two areas. In the South neither ALMP nor the participation rate seems to account for changes in the employment rate: employment is driven by its own shocks in the short term and by social and economic context variables at longer time horizons. By contrast, in the northern regions, the employment dynamics is significantly explained by remuneration and hours worked.
Finally, we report the fraction of employment rate, participation rate and ALMP explained by the eleven selected variables introduced above in table 12. In both models, the variable that exerts the largest influence on employment rate is the unemployment rate. Interestingly, while in the South the dynamics of ALMP is significantly driven by GDP and GVA movements (almost 10%), in the North changes in active labour market policies are explained by changes in the unemployment rate (about 13%). Note: ESI = Firm start-up Index; GDP = gross domestic product; VCR = Legality condition Index; SSER = Secondary School Enrolment Rate; GVA = gross value added; HW = Total Hours Worked; IN = Total Investment; TR = Total Remuneration; FDIA = Foreign Direct Investment Attraction Index; UR = Unemployment Rate; LUR = Long-term Unemployment Rate.
In order to evaluate whether different policies might have a heterogeneous impact on regional economies we simulate the same model (equation 4 and 5) changing only the variable representing the policy instrument. All other variables remain the same. More precisely, we substitute the total participants in ALMP with participants in training and employment incentives programs. All policy variables are expressed as percentage of labour force. Table 13 presents the results. Both policies have a greater impact on northern labour market. A 1% increase in training leads to a rise of 30 basis points in southern employment after 3 years. In the North, this result is reached after only one year, while after three years the effect is almost the double (0.61%).
The results are very similar when looking at the reaction of the participation rate: the induced increase in training produces a 0.63% and 0.28% growth in the North and the South, respectively.
This difference in the reaction is not reduced when evaluating the effect of employment incentives.
A policy shock that increases (by 1%) employment incentives also exerts a greater effect on 27 northern employment (0.34) and participation (0.29) compared to the reaction of the same variable in the South (0.24 and 0.12 respectively).
Overall, consistently with the aggregate measure of ALMP we have used in the benchmark model, also when considering specific policies, such as training and employment incentives, the reaction of northern labour markets is stronger and faster than the one in southern regions. 
Policy implications
Why might centralized ALMPs heterogeneously affect the regional labour market? Overall, the results obtained in the empirical analysis suggest two main policy implications.
First, the success of active policies depends on the regional labour market conditions. More precisely, ALMPs are less effective in regions with poor labour market outcomes. We find evidence that the impact of ALMPs is increasing with the regional employment rate. Similar results were obtained in recent papers by McVicar and Podivinsky (2010) and Blien et al. (2010) .
There is much debate, but surprisingly little evidence, on the question of whether Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) have differential effects depending on regional labour market characteristics. On the one hand, we might expect ALMPs to have greater impacts in "tight" labour markets because more and perhaps better job vacancies exist. On the other hand, ALMPs might have larger impacts in very depressed labour markets because the added value of such programmes is higher. Recent studies of East Germany, a natural benchmark for the Italian Mezzogiorno 18 , provide a rather pessimistic assessment of the overall effectiveness of ALMPs in less developed regions. Lechner and Wunsch (2009) , for example, found that training programmes and two other employment programmes implemented in East Germany failed to increase the employment 28 chances and earnings of their participants. Wunsch and Lechner (2008) also conclude that in the very depressed labour market of East Germany, the effectiveness of ALMP is very low.
Consistently, our results strongly suggest that regional structure and labour market conditions significantly reduce the effectiveness of the ALMP in southern Italian regions: the heterogeneous effects found at regional level suggest that these measures are only effective in regions characterised by efficient labour markets. The idea is that since active programmes aim to assist the unemployed to get back into work, their effectiveness crucially depends on the supply of job vacancies (Martin, 1998) . Therefore, it comes as no surprise that, in our analysis, active measures in regions generating few vacancies (the southern regions) have been found relatively ineffective.
In other words, the large disparities among Italian regions mirror a different functioning of regional labour markets. In the regions where there are many applicants for few vacancies and the markets face structural problems, employment incentives may not be effective in activating employment dynamics and production and are likely to become subsidies to the underemployed. By contrast, when there are few applicants for many vacancies, the matching function can be improved by boosting labour contracts and training. As a consequence, a "one-size-fits-all" labour market strategy that does not take such disparities into account produces asymmetric effects on regional economies.
Second, policymakers should adjust labour policy strategy to the regional economic structure. In other words, when designing a labour market strategy, the economic context should be taken into account.
Our analysis strongly suggests that contextual factors might play a crucial role in determining the appropriate programmes to be implemented. ALMP appears to differently influence employment in Therefore, our empirical findings highlight the importance of considering the regional economic structure when implementing ALMP.
Overall, the results are in line with the adoption of a "New Regionalism" approach (Cook, 2008; ) which stresses the crucial role played by regional and local economic development in designing institutional changes and policy strategies.
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Active labour market policies could be more effective and efficient if their implementation is based on decentralised operational responsibility. In fact, as demonstrated above, when policies are centralized, regions tend to use a similar policy mix. Decentralisation might instead lead to a stronger adjustment of the policy mix to local economic structures.
Conclusions
Our study evaluated whether active labour market policies made at the national level generate asymmetric effects when regions have different economic structures. Using empirical analysis, we studied the possible asymmetries that the implementation of ALMPs might produce in regional labour market performance.
The macroeconometric model employed to estimate the effect of ALMP on labour market variables is a panel FAVAR that exploits the relevant information from a data-rich environment.
We first estimated the common factors of employment by principal components. Factor analysis suggests that for both areas of the country four factors explain a high percentage of the variance.
These factors summarize variables related to the social and economic structure, investment, the financial market and the labour market.
We then simulated the model to measure the dynamic impact of ALMPs on regional labour markets. The results suggest that the impulse responses for the northern regions are substantially larger than those for the South and, more interesting, the employment rate in the selected regions responds to identical labour policy shocks with different speeds and movements, as well as with different magnitudes of the effects. ALMPs appeared to influence employment and participation rate differently and produce a longer-lasting effect in northern regions. An exogenous ALMP shock is transmitted to employment through participation rate. Although the size of shock is identical, the percentage of non-participants entering the labour force that filled new jobs in the North is larger.
The final effect on employment, which depends on the level of job reallocation produced by the policy shock, results in a new equilibrium employment level above the initial value of the shock.
However, the reallocation process in the South generates a smaller amount of additional jobs than in the North. This means that in the North, the amount of search effort and, in turn, successful job reallocation significantly depends on the levels of ALMP which in turn speed up transition into new jobs.
Finally, the forecast error variance decomposition yielded information on how various structural shocks affect the behaviour of each variable at different time horizons. This analysis showed that the short-term dynamics of employment are largely dominated by their own shocks, and no association with active labour market programmes or with the dynamics of the participation rate can be displayed. For long time horizons, we find that both ALMP and participation rate have a 30 certain influence in determining employment dynamics but this influence varies across regions.
Employment movements driven by ALMP shocks are more than double in northern regions.
Moreover, as regards the influence of different factors on the dynamics of the employment rate, we found that in the South the first factor, which is related to the social and economic context, significantly affects long-term movements in the employment rate. In the northern regions, by contrast, employment dynamics seems to be partially explained by the dynamics of the fourth factor (related to hours worked and remuneration).
We conclude that there are different explanations for labour market dynamics in the two areas.
In the South, labour market indicators are largely driven by shock in the economic structure. By contrast, in the northern regions, employment and participation dynamics are significantly explained by active labour market programmes.
Overall, our results highlighted that the large disparities among Italian regions mirror a different functioning of regional labour markets (each region might have a Beveridge curve that differs in terms of position and slope). As a consequence, a "one-size-fits-all" labour market strategy that does not take such disparities into account produces asymmetric effects on regional economies.
Finally, we suggest two main policy implications. First, the success of active policies depends on the regional labour market conditions. As a consequence, policymakers should be very careful in promoting ALMPs in very depressed labour markets. In fact, depending on the characteristics of regional labour markets the effectiveness of these programs might significantly vary. Second, policymakers should adjust labour policy strategy to the regional economic structure. It follows that when designing a labour market strategy, the economic context should be heavily taken into account. Note: Numbers on the horizontal axis refer to the ordering of the variables as reported in Appendix 1. Then, 1-18 social and economic context; 19-22 crime; 23-27 infrastructure; 28-30 education; 31-34 health; 35-51 GVA; 53-70 hours worked; 71-88 investment; 89-106 remuneration; 107-110 import/export; 111-119 financial market; 120-124 labour market
Appendix 1: Variables used in the empirical analysis

